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11 Introduction
Project-based emissions trading schemes have recently increased in importance due to the
successful implementation of the Kyoto markets. These schemes allow project developers, out-
side the regulation of cap-and-trade schemes, to sell their certiﬁed emission reductions on the
cap-and-trade market. Indeed, credit-based mechanisms represent the only—although second-
best—option to extend emissions trading to countries unwilling to take on emission targets.
This is particularly important as within the current Kyoto architecture, these countries have
the largest share of low-cost emission reductions. Yet project-based schemes, like the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), are particularly vulnerable to problems of incomplete en-
forcement. Information asymmetries between the regulator and project developers create an
incentive to overstate emission oﬀsets, sold on the market for emission rights. This problem
is often more severe under credit-based systems than standard market-based environmental
policy instruments, where cheating is reduced to a misrepresentation of actual emissions. It
is, therefore, natural to ask how the regulator determines optimal monitoring policy under a
project-based system and how this policy compares to standard market-based regulation.
To answer these questions, we develop an analytical model of a credit-based system that
takes potential overreporting of emission reductions into account. We focus on the optimal de-
cisions of the regulator, given the impossibility to fully enforce compliance, under asymmetric
information on reduction costs and heterogeneous veriﬁability of projects. We show, given a
limited monitoring budget, a rational regulator will completely refrain from monitoring those
projects that are most diﬃcult to verify. For larger monitoring budgets, the optimal moni-
toring strategy can be discontinuous, featuring a jump within the set of projects with lower
veriﬁability. Furthermore, for those projects in full compliance, the monitoring pressure reduces
with increasing veriﬁability of the projects. For cases with intermediate veriﬁability, optimal
monitoring pressure is ambiguous. For these levels of veriﬁability, we identify conditions for
which monitoring pressure is either at its maximum or for which there exists a ‘U-shaped’-style
monitoring policy.
Given the importance of enforcing environmental policies, considerations of incomplete en-
forcement of instruments has become an important research ﬁeld. Early research mainly fo-
cused on the comparison of emission taxes and pollution standards. The ﬁrst formal model
on this issue was developed in Harford (1978), which was extended in Harford (1987) to in-
clude self-reporting by ﬁrms. Within more recent research the analyses were extended to the
comparative performance of diﬀerent environmental policy instruments under incomplete en-
forcement. Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) focus on the diﬀerence between emission taxes and
output taxes. Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) analyze the optimal enforcement pol-
icy in the context of per-unit emission taxes. Further analysis has also been conducted on
cap-and-trade programs (Keeler 1991, Macho-Stadler 2006, Malik 1990, Stranlund and Chavez
2000, Stranlund et al. 2005, Stranlund 2007).1
Yet, the literature on credit-based systems is sparse.2 To our knowledge, there exists no
formal model deriving optimal monitoring. This is particularly unfortunate in light of the
elevated potential for fraudulent misreporting within such schemes. Recently, Macho-Stadler
and Perez-Castrillo (2006) analyzed optimal monitoring policy under an emissions tax, assuming
the regulator’s objective is to minimize the spread between actual emissions and their optimal
level. They show that monitoring should be used for the easiest-to-monitor ﬁrms as well as
1For literature surveys on environmental regulation, see Cohen (1999) and Heyes (2000).
2A notable exception is Sigman and Chang (2011), identifying the basic trade-oﬀs in incomplete enforcement
when integrating a credit-based regime into a cap-and-trade market.
2ﬁrms that value pollution less. Yet when considering credit-based mechanisms, the regulator’s
objective is diﬀerent. Not only does the regulator want to minimize actual emissions but
also the overstatement within projects’ reported emissions. Further, it is plausible that the
regulator only has a rough notion of the true cost of speciﬁc types of reduction projects. Our
paper, therefore, extends the analysis of regulating emitters with heterogeneous veriﬁability by
Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) to include the monitoring of credit-based mechanisms
with asymmetric information over project cost.
The paper is structured as follows. In the following subsection the general problem of
opportunistic false reporting in credit-based systems is explained further. The presentation
of the formal model starts with section 2, where the abatement and reporting decisions of a
rational project developer are derived. Section 2.2 presents the optimal monitoring policy of
a regulator disposing of an unlimited budget. In section 3, optimal monitoring is analyzed
under the more realistic assumption of a limited budget and compares this to the case of tax
regulation, while section 4 extends the model to discuss project admission. Section 5 has some
concluding remarks.
1.1 Background
The basic idea of credit-based emissions trading is to incentivize emission reductions on a
project-by-project basis. A prominent example is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM):
a policy tool under the Kyoto Protocol that reduces greenhouse gases in developing countries.
Emission reductions generated through projects are scrutinized by the regulator then sold on
the carbon market in the form of Certiﬁed Emission Reductions (CERs). The importance
of the CDM has increased over the last 10 years with aggregated CDM reductions expected
to exceed 2.7 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalents (UNEP/Risoe (2010)). The CDM has allowed
access to low-cost reduction potentials within developing countries. Yet, generally, the necessity
to regulate a project-by-project approach has resulted in high transaction costs. Typically,
project certiﬁcates are generated by comparing a hypothetical baseline emission scenario with
the realized project emission reductions. The diﬀerence is then transformed into tradable
emission credits. CDM projects, therefore, are required to go through a meticulous process
of scrutinization for the project itself, as well as its baseline, before being allowed to generate
credits (UNFCCC 2002). For this reason, schemes can only be recommended for situations
where a cap-and-trade scheme cannot be implemented. This was the case at the conception of
the CDM, as developing countries—just as at present—were unwilling to take binding emission
reduction targets.
Within credit-based mechanisms, it is plausible that some level of information asymmetry
persists between project parties and the regulator. The baseline, for example, should ideally
represent the scenario without project implementation. Clearly, any alternative plans for the
project site are, by deﬁnition, private information, which is a priori unobservable to the regula-
tor. Hence, there exists an incentive to submit a baseline scenario to the regulator, which leads
to an overstatement of emission reductions, and hence more credits. A prominent case where
such a practice has been identiﬁed ex post, is associated with a reduction of hydroﬂuorocarbons
(HFC)—a potent greenhouse gas—in China (Wara 2007, 2008). Due to incorrect estimates of
cost structures and market forecasts, baseline emissions were too generous. As a consequence,
the CDM Executive Board halted issuance for such projects and the European Commission
decided to ban CERs from HFC projects within the EU ETS from 2013 onwards.3 Note that
3See, for example, WorldBank (2011).
3this baseline information asymmetry is hence fundamental to the issue of additionality within
the CDM: the risk that certiﬁcates might not represent actual emission reductions.
It is also reasonable to assume that some project types are easier to identify as being
additional than others. Solar projects, for example, are—due to their relatively high per unit
cost—more likely to be additional than the reduction of industrial gases, which can often be
easily substituted by other substances.4 Furthermore, due to diﬀerences in data quality, future
developments in product markets are easier to assess in some host countries than in others. A
regulator’s monitoring strategy, then, has to take these diﬀerences in project veriﬁability into
account.
The risk of fraudulent non-compliance is not limited to credit-based mechanisms, but repre-
sents, in fact, a problem for any type of environmental regulation. For example, in a cap-and-
trade emissions trading system, potential net buyers might be tempted to report compliance
with their emissions target to avoid purchasing emission credits.5 Obviously, as emission per-
mits have a positive market value, such overreporting also beneﬁts net sellers, which can increase
their revenues from emission rights. As a consequence, due to the risk of opportunistic misre-
porting, an environmental policy needs to include an enforcement mechanism to be eﬀective.
An environmental regulator is hence mandated to ensure environmental eﬀectiveness and carry
out costly monitoring activities in order to reduce the amount of misreporting. However, in a
resource-constrained world, monitoring and enforcement is likely to be incomplete. For these
cases, Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) show that a regulator, which discriminates
between the veriﬁability of emission reports, should accept an arbitrarily large amount of over-
reporting and opt instead for a monitoring strategy that induces the largest portion of emitters
to reduce emissions to their optimal level.6
For credit-based emissions trading, however, the use of such a strategy will not minimize
emissions in the overall emissions market. To see this, note that the demand for oﬀset credits is
typically stemming from an associated cap-and-trade regime. The CDM is, for instance, linked
into both the Kyoto inter-country cap-and-trade market and the European Union Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS). Due to the fungibility between emission permits (e.g. EIT AAUs
from EU ETS) and emission credits (e.g. CDM CER), the latter has a positive value driven
by the permit market price. Fungibility, however, also means that an oﬀset credit that is not
backed by an actual emission reduction, but created by fraudulent overreporting at zero cost,
will crowd out more expensive reductions within the system.7 Note further that this crowding
out is unlikely to have a large eﬀect on prices, as cap-and-trade markets tend to be signiﬁcantly
larger than the credit-based mechanisms. For example, the market volume of the EU ETS in
2010 was reported to be about 119 billion USD, while the size of the primary CDM market
amounted only to 1.5 billion USD (WorldBank 2011). In the political discussion, the problem
of erroneous or non-additional credits represents the main argument against the continuation
of such schemes. However, as long as the gains from the realized emission reductions are
4See, for example, (Wara 2007, 2008).
5A similar rationale applies in the case of a per-unit tax on emissions, as the reported emissions represent
the basis from which the overall tax burden for the regulated entity is derived.
6Obviously, such a strategy is only necessary if the optimal amount of emissions diverges from the ’maximum
believable’ amount, which will be reported by most emitters in such a situation.
7The situation resembles a ‘market for lemons’, while diﬀering by the fact that a credit only loses its value
if it is identiﬁed as erroneous by the regulator.
4larger than the cost of implementation, the credit-based mechanisms will continue to play an
important role when cap-and-trade schemes are infeasible.8
The existence of the above-described crowding out of legitimate permits by erroneous credits
requires a regulator to minimize emissions within the combined market, which requires a dif-
ferent monitoring strategy than the one depicted in Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006).
For credit-based schemes, the regulator cannot conﬁne himself to guarantee eﬃcient levels of
emission reductions, but also needs to reduce overreporting to minimize the amount of erro-
neous credits in the whole system. In the following, we present a model, to derive the optimal
monitoring within a credit-based emissions trading regime.
2 The model
Consider a regulated credit-based emissions trading scheme, populated by a set of project
developers Φ = {1,2,...,n} with cost type j = {g,b}, which choose levels of emission reductions
e at a cost cj(e) with c′
j(e) > 0, c′′
j(e) > 0, ∀ e. For any level of emission reductions e, projects
of type g and b diﬀer in abatement costs by cg(e) < cb(e) and c′
g(e) < c′
b(e). That is, for a given
level of emissions reductions, (marginal) abatement costs are larger for a ‘bad’ b-type than a
‘good’ g-type.9 The cost functions are common knowledge whereas the cost type is private
information to the project developer. The regulator is assumed to know the relative frequency
of a g-type given by π, while a b-type occurs with converse probability (1 − π).
Where actual project reductions are fully observable and enforceable, each project partici-




g) = p and hence e∗
b < e∗
g, where p is the
equilibrium permit price and e∗
j is the resulting ﬁrst-best optimal level of emission reductions
for type j. This represents the well-known result that under perfect competition with complete
information, marginal abatement costs are equated to the equilibrium certiﬁcate price.
2.1 Project decision under incomplete enforcement
A more realistic setup is to assume that neither the project’s cost type j nor the chosen level
of emission reduction ej are directly observable by the regulator. Instead, to receive reduction
credits, the project developer submits a report over emissions reductions zj, which does not
necessarily correspond to the emission level actually chosen. Note that, with rational actors,
reported emission reductions zj will never be less than the actual reductions ej. However, as
certiﬁcates command value, the developer might be tempted to overreport emission reductions,
such that zj > ej is possible. However, given that the regulator knows (or has an adequate
notion of) the cost functions and the market price, he will never accept a report larger than
e∗
g, the level of ‘good’-type reductions under full observability. While ‘bad’-type projects can
mimic a ‘good’ type in reporting, ‘good’ types are limited to simple overreporting, which would
be the case if eg < e∗
g but zg = e∗
g is reported.
8In the current international climate policy negotiations, creditable NAMAs (Nationally Appropriate Mit-
igation Actions) are discussed in order to incentivize emission reductions in developing countries. (See, for
example, Okubo et al. (2011).
9This diﬀerentiation in cost types might well occur within one speciﬁc class of projects, implementing the
same type of technology. For example, two windpower generation projects designed to replace coal-based power
generation might install exactly the same type of equipment and capacity, but diﬀerences in average wind speed
at the chosen projects sites could still lead to a diﬀerence in abatement costs.
5In order to induce truthful reporting, the regulator has the possibility to monitor projects.10
We assume that even if monitored with probability 1, veriﬁability of the report diﬀers over
diﬀerent classes of projects. For example, the baseline of a solar project is easier to verify than
for projects reducing industrial greenhouse gases.11 To reﬂect this, we assume that each class of
projects is associated with a commonly observable class-speciﬁc parameter β ∈ [0,1], reﬂecting
its veriﬁability. If β is 1 and the project is monitored, the regulator is capable to determine,
without further problems, whether the project developer has overreported or not. As β tends
to 0, the more improbable is the success of such an assessment. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume class designator β to be uniformly distributed with density function probability
function F(β) = β and density f(β) = 1. This distribution is common knowledge.12 Given
that the class of a project is observable, the regulator can discriminate among classes in his
monitoring decision. For each project class the regulator chooses a monitoring probability α(β),
with α ∈ [0,1]. It is assumed that this probability is known to the project participants. For
example, in reality, α would be determined by the expected frequency of ‘spot-checks’ on each
project class by the regulator.
In case overreporting is discovered, project developers are required to pay back the revenue
from overreported reductions and, in addition, pay a ﬁne. The regulator is assumed to make the
ﬁne contingent on the overreported amount xj, deﬁned as xj = zj−ej. If a project is monitored
its expected penalty is hence dependent on its veriﬁability class β and the overreported amount
xj. We deﬁne this expected penalty as β · θ(xj), with θ(0) = 0, θ′(·) > 0, θ′′(·) > 0, and
θ′(0) > p. The last assumption ensures that a non-compliant developer that is caught will pay
back revenue related to overreported reductions as well as paying a ﬁne. Assuming the expected
penalty to be convex in the magnitude of the oﬀense is quite realistic, as it seems to be in line
with legal practice under many diﬀerent circumstances.13 Furthermore, it is relatively simple
to show the probability of discovery for any project of class β can be increasing and convex in
x.
For the choice of class-speciﬁc monitoring pressure α(β), we assume the regulator anticipates
the project participant’s optimization given the respective level of monitoring. In order to
present this choice, we ﬁrst describe the project developers’ optimization over ej and zj for
an unspeciﬁed level of α(β) and then discuss the characteristics of α(β) for a regulator taking
these optimal choices into account.
Note that for reasons explained above, a project developer cannot report a reduction level
larger than e∗
g. Given that the regulator knows the technologies that are in the market, there
exist only two plausible levels of emission reductions that can be reported without raising the
10In the context of the Clean Development Mechanism, the role of the regulator is taken up by the CDM
Executive Board and its supporting panels. As a consequence, the decisions of the external veriﬁers—the
Designated Operational Entities—are not explicitly modeled here. This simpliﬁcation is justiﬁable on the
grounds that the CDM veriﬁcation mechanism is not capable to fully deter opportunistic overreporting (Wara
(2007, 2008)). This incomplete deterrence can also be attributed to the fact that the DOEs are remunerated
by the project participants, potential collusion in reporting of emission reductions cannot be excluded.
11Heyes (1994) provides further reasoning for divergence in veriﬁability levels. In particular, Heyes (1994)
considers the case where ﬁrms can endogenously determine their ‘inspectability’ by investing in appropriate
technologies.
12Alternatively, the regulator can be assumed to have no information about the underlying distribution, and
assumes for lack of that knowledge, that β is uniformly distributed.
13The assumption of convex punishment is widely used in a large part of the literature on incomplete en-




b.14 With these restrictions, the developer’s optimization problem
for a project of veriﬁability class β and cost type j are
max
{ej,zj}











where p is the exogenous permit price, and e∗
g and e∗
b are the ﬁrst-best eﬃcient levels of emission
reductions for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ types, respectively.
It is hence taken into account within the cost function that in case overreporting is discov-
ered, project developers will have to return excess certiﬁcates and pay a ﬁne according to the






b(eb) + α(β) · β θ





g(eg) + α(β) · β θ
′(zg − eg) = 0. (3)
By use of (1) to (3), we can characterize the optimal solution for diﬀerent levels of α(β).
From (1), if α(β) · β = 0 the developer’s payoﬀ is maximized at zj = e∗
g and ej = 0, that is, at
the maximum possible amount of overreporting. From (1), when values of αβ are close enough
to 0, it is eﬃcient for both types to increase emission reductions while continuing to report the
highest plausible reduction, i.e. zj = e∗






It is hence to be shown at what level of α(β) both types prefer to report e∗
b rather than e∗
g.
Starting with ‘bad’ types, assume, for a moment, that (4) holds at the level of α(β) at which
b-types are induced to choose their ﬁrst-best level of emissions (eb = e∗




b) = p, we can derive a threshold level ˆ α(β) at which zb = e∗



















It is easy to see that this condition always holds at ˆ α(β), as penalty βθ(·) is assumed to








b) = p, condition (4) will also always hold for ‘good’ type projects,
such that ‘good’ types will always report their ﬁrst-best levels, i.e. zg = e∗
g.
14Note that the results are qualitatively similar when n > 2 costs types are used. In this case, there would
be n discontinuities.
7Interestingly, at ˆ α(β) inequality (5) is strict. With further increases in α(β) there exists
a range within which ‘bad’ type project developers will choose to further increase emission
reductions beyond the ﬁrst-best levels e∗
g instead of choosing to report truthfully: there exists
a range of ‘over-reduction’, up to a level eb > e∗
b, at which Ub(eb,e∗
g) = Uj(e∗
b,e∗
b). From this we








Threshold ˇ α(β) represents the minimum audit probability that induces a report zb = e∗
b, i.e.
truthful reporting of a b-type. Note, this probability level is only feasible if ˇ α ≤ 1. We denote








Finally, as ‘good’ types will always report zg = e∗
g, full compliance of g-type projects are
obtained for levels of α high enough to implement eg = e∗
g. Again, the threshold ˜ α(β) that









Again, this probability level is only feasible if ˜ α ≤ 1, i.e. β ≥ ˜ β, where ˜ β is deﬁned by





Note that under the above-made assumptions, for any given β, ˆ α(β) < ˇ α(β) < ˜ α(β).
Hence, there exists full compliance for all projects for which α(β) ∈ [˜ α,1]. Summarizing the
above-made considerations, Figure 1 depicts the compliance behavior of ‘good’- and ‘bad’-type
projects in dependence of monitoring probability α.
2.2 Regulator’s optimal monitoring policy with an unlimited budget
Given the optimizing behavior of project participants, a regulator needs to identify an optimal
monitoring strategy.15 In order to model the monitoring decision with an existing project pool,
the regulator is assumed to face a population of already registered projects. For simplicity,
the cost of monitoring one project is normalized to one. Aggregated monitoring cost cannot
transgress the regulator’s monitoring budget, denoted with B.
Without discovery of non-compliance, a project is issued emission reduction certiﬁcates
corresponding to its reported amount zj. As explained in section 1.1, credits not backed by
actual emission reductions are non-additional and hence reduce the environmental integrity of
the overall carbon market. The regulator minimizing emissions in the integrated system can
hence not conﬁne himself to maximize aggregated emission reductions, but also has to take the
problem of overreporting into account. Hence, the objective of the enforcement agency within
15For a discussion on how regulatory attitudes alter monitoring policy and environmental innovation, see the














Figure 1: Reported projects and actual emission reductions
the setup presented here is to minimize aggregated overreporting, while maximizing emission
reductions.
As depicted in Figure 1, for small α and any given β a change in monitoring pressure
only inﬂuences emission reductions ej, while zj remains—for both cost types—at its corner
solution e∗
g. For b-type projects, a further increase in α will only lead to an adjustment of
zb to its truthful level e∗
b after the emission reductions have reached their optimal level. As
for g-types, the corner solution for zg is equal to e∗
g, where overreporting is only reduced to
zero if the emission reductions reach exactly this level. This behavior of the project developers
simpliﬁes the formulation of the regulator’s objective function. If the regulator minimizes
weighted aggregations of overreporting xj = zj − ej over all classes of β, he will also achieve a
maximization of emission reductions. Hence, the enforcement agency chooses the monitoring













α(β) n dβ ≤ B (7)
and
9eg(β) ∈ argmax {Ug(eg)}, (8)
eb(β),zb(β) ∈ argmax {Ub(eb,zb)}. (9)
To choose an optimal monitoring scheme, the agency needs to take into account its budget
constraint (7), and the proﬁt maximization of the project participants (8) and (9). Within this
subsection we only consider the second constraint to be binding.
We denote the minimum budget incentivizing maximum emission reductions by ¯ B, which
is deﬁned by:
¯ B ≡ ˜ β n +
∫ 1
˜ β
˜ α(β) n dβ. (10)
Proposition 1 immediately follows:
Proposition 1. When B ≥ ¯ B the cost-minimizing agency sets an audit policy that satisﬁes
α(β) = 1, for β ∈ [0, ˇ β) and α(β) ∈ [ˇ α(β),1] for β ∈ [ˇ β,1].
Proposition 1 conﬁrms similar ﬁndings to the case with emissions taxes. When a scheme
includes projects with large information asymmetries between project participants and the
regulator, an increase in budget does not necessarily lead to a reduction in overreporting. As
soon as the budget level ¯ B is reached, the marginal rate of deterrence equals zero. Hence, even
if a maximization of reductions is the only objective of the agency, eﬃciency requires that the
auditing budget of the regulator should be capped at ¯ B.
3 Monitoring with a limited budget
In practice, it is likely that the number of audits performed by the regulator is constrained
by his budget. It is hence realistic to assume that the budget constraint (7) of the regulator’s
optimization problem is binding. Thus, in the following it is assumed that B ≤ ¯ B.
Within a budget-constrained optimization, the regulator needs to decide which β classes
should experience an increase in spot-check frequency to obtain the largest decrease in overall
emissions. As the regulator cannot observe a project’s cost type, the expected amount of





g − eg(αβ)) + (1 − π)(zb(αβ) − eb(αβ))
)
. (11)
For any two projects with class β1 and β2, a shift in monitoring eﬀort of ∆α from project
class 1 to project class 2 is (weakly) eﬃcient if




   
   
e∗
g, for α(β) = 0,
π(e∗
g − eg(αβ)) + (1 − π)(e∗
g − eb(αβ)), for 0 < α(β) < ˇ α(β),
π(e∗
g − eg(αβ)), for ˇ α(β) ≤ α(β) < ˜ α(β),
0, for ˜ α(β) ≤ α(β) ≤ 1,
(13)
10where the case separation in (13) is determined through the optimal reaction of the project
developer. An auditing schedule (α(β))β∈[0,1] is eﬃcient if (12) holds for any arbitrary pairwise
comparison of two diﬀerent project types.
Hence, determining the optimal auditing policy involves a trade-oﬀ in monitoring pressure
in the range 0 < α < ˜ α. Note that ϵβ(α) is discontinuous at ˇ α(β), i.e. the threshold at
which b-types start to truthful report zb = e∗
b. Above and below this threshold level, ϵβ(α) is
diﬀerentiable with respect to α. The derivative of ϵ can be derived from (2), (11), and (13) by


























g−eg(αβ)), for ˇ α(β) ≤ α ≤ ˜ α(β),
0, for α > ˜ α(β),
(14)
which is used to derive the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under a limited budget B < B, optimal monitoring policy implies that there
exists a threshold βl(B) > 0, such that the regulator chooses α = 0 for β ≤ βl(B). Projects
with β > βl(B) will always be monitored with α > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 states that there exists a threshold level βl(B) where lower veriﬁable projects
will not be monitored, whereas all other projects will receive a positive probability of monitoring.
This threshold tends to decrease with larger levels of budget B, but will always exist for B < B.
This is in line with the optimal monitoring under an emissions tax, presented in Macho-Stadler
and Perez-Castrillo (2006).





g−eb) in (14), optimal monitoring cannot be simply
assessed via an equalization of the derivatives dϵ
dα for diﬀerent levels of β, as we must take into
consideration the change in expected overreporting ϵ that occur exactly at this discontinuity.
In particular, for any β, the gain from monitoring a b-type when increasing α(β) from 0 to
ˇ α(β), is e∗
g, which consists of emissions reduction e∗
b as well as the reduction in over-reporting
e∗
g − e∗
b. For g-type projects, the same increase in monitoring pressure yields an increase in
emission reductions of eg(ˇ α(β) · β) = eg(1 · ˇ β). Thus, the expected gains per unit of α from
spending exactly ˇ α(β) for any level of β > ˇ β, designated with D(β) are:
D(β) =













g − eg(ˇ β))). (15)
Obviously, from (12), it is safe to state that the regulator will choose at least ˇ α(β) for
a speciﬁc project type β, if D(β) is larger than any dϵ
dα at all other combinations of α(β)
and β. Note from (14) that the largest marginal beneﬁt in reduction of overreporting is at
α = 0,β = 1. On the other hand, the minimum (feasible) level of ˇ α(β) lies at β = ˇ β. This
allows us to establish a suﬃcient condition for which it is always eﬃcient to incentivize truthful























11In order to assess the conditions under which (16) holds we introduce a measure γ, repre-





Obviously, the larger γ, the more imminent is the problem of asymmetric information over













For a large enough share of b-type projects in the market, the regulator will always use his
budget to induce truthful reporting within b-type projects in the veriﬁability classes, where this
is possible, i.e. for β ≥ ˇ β. As it is sensible to consider situations with an imminent problem of
asymmetric information over types, we assume (18) to hold throughout the rest of this paper.
Based on this assumption, the following proposition can be established immediately by noting
(7), and the equivalence of (16) and (18):
Proposition 3. If (18) holds, then
i) If B > ˇ α(1) n , there exists a βm ≥ βl, such that zb = e∗
b for all β ≥ βm. The value of βm
is non-decreasing in B.
ii) For B =
∫ 1
β0 ˇ α(β) n dβ with ˇ β < β0 < 1, the regulator will incentivize truthful reporting
for bad type projects, by choosing an audit pressure of ˇ α for all projects with β ≥ β0.
Projects with β < β0 will not be monitored. Hence, βm = βl = β0.
iii) For B ≥
∫ 1
ˇ β ˇ α(β) n dβ the regulator will always incentivize truthful reporting for bad type
projects over the range of projects where this is possible, i.e. β ∈ [ˇ β,1].
Proposition 3 further speciﬁes the characteristics of an optimal monitoring schedule for
credit-based systems. Proposition 3 (i), establishes the existence of a threshold level βm where
full compliance of ‘bad’ types is induced for larger β. When the monitoring budget becomes
larger than that required to ensure full compliance in the class easiest to verify (i.e. β = 1),
the regulator will induce zb = e∗
b, starting with highest levels of β and continuing to do so for
decreasing β, as long as this is feasible within the given budget. It is hence optimal to refrain
from monitoring projects of lower levels of β. This is shown within Proposition 3 (ii), where
for the sake of simplicity, no residual budget exists.16 Finally, proposition 3 (iii) explains that
if the budget is suﬃciently large to enable the regulator to induce zb = e∗
b for all classes where
this is feasible, it is indeed optimal to do so.
Given these insights, the question arises of how larger budgets should be allocated, which go




cases, the regulator has to compare the marginal gains associated with increased audit pressure
on project classes where β < ˇ β and β > ˇ β. That is, is it more eﬃcient to add additional








16For the sake of brevity we refrain from an extensive exposition on the use of the residual budget. Note,
however, that this optimal use can be easily inferred from propositions 4 to 8 below.
12By use of condition (19), deﬁnition (17), and noting that ˇ α(1) = ˇ β, we can derive the
following proposition:
Proposition 4. If B >
∫ 1














then βl < ˇ β.
Proposition 4 establishes a suﬃcient condition for which, with the existence of a larger
budget, it is optimal to use at least some of the resources to apply monitoring pressure to those
projects with β < ˇ β. As stated in condition (20), this is the case if the probability of a b-type
occurring is suﬃciently large.
We now investigate a case where it might be eﬃcient to, instead, increase auditing pressure
for those projects where β > ˇ β. This is surely the case if inducing full compliance for all β ≥ ˜ β
yields a higher marginal gain than starting to induce positive pressure, at levels β < ˇ β. Hence,







From (7) and (21), we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 5. If
∫ 1
ˇ β ˇ α(β) n dβ < B ≤
∫ ˜ β
ˇ β ˇ α(β) n dβ +
∫ 1

















then βl = βm = ˇ β.
Proposition 5 establishes suﬃcient conditions for which the regulator will refrain from mon-
itoring projects with veriﬁability lower than ˇ β. This is obviously the case if the share of g-type
projects is not too low. This is intuitive, as ‘bad’ types with β ≥ ˇ β are already in compli-
ance. A low share of ‘good’ types would hence imply that the additional gains from increasing
monitoring pressure on projects with high veriﬁability will be low.
Note, however, that for the budget range given in Proposition 5 it is not guaranteed that
there exists a veriﬁability class for which g-type projects are in full compliance. Suﬃcient
conditions for this being the case are established in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. For a large enough budget B, there exists a βh > βm where zg = e∗
g and zb = e∗
b
for all β ≥ βh.
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If the budget is large enough, the regulator is able to incentivize full compliance for all types
with β larger or equal to the threshold level βh. The budget level required for the existence of
βh is dependent on whether the regulator chooses to also put a positive monitoring pressure on
classes of projects lower than ˇ β. If this is the case, it is possible via the comparison of slopes to
express the level of βh as a function of the threshold βl, which is expressed in Proposition 6 (i).
If βl = ˇ β, a lower amount of budget is required for the existence of βh. Suﬃcient conditions for
the budget level required for the existence are given in Proposition 6 (ii).
Given that threshold classes ˆ β, ˇ β, and ˜ β can be derived from the individual optimization of
project developers, a budget close enough to B, automatically ensures the existence of all three
thresholds—βl, βm, and βh—within the optimal monitoring schedule. It remains to discuss the
general features of the optimal monitoring schedule (α(β))β∈[0,1] between those thresholds. For
βl ̸= βm, α(β) is increasing between both thresholds, as α(βl) = 0, while monitoring pressure
for β close enough to βm is strictly positive. Furthermore, for levels larger than βh, optimal
monitoring α(β) is strictly decreasing, as ˜ α(β) is decreasing in β, and no additional reduction
in overreporting can be achieved by choosing α > ˜ α(β).
The characteristics of optimal monitoring between βm and βh are less clear. On the one hand,
we assume that—provided a large enough budget—all projects with β ≥ ˇ β will be monitored
with at least probability ˇ α(β). Given that ˇ α(β) is decreasing in β, there exists a tendency for
decreasing auditing pressure within [βm; βh]. Yet, there might exist also a tendency to increase
auditing pressure for higher levels of β if ∂2ϵ
∂α∂β > 0. Note, however, that this is surely not the
case if dϵ
dα is strictly decreasing in β. An interesting case arises then if the budget is large enough
for βh = ˜ β, as ˇ α(ˇ β) = ˜ α(˜ β) = 1. Hence, in this case if ∂2ϵ
∂α∂β < 0 all project classes in [ˇ β; ˜ β] will
also be monitored with probability 1. We summarize this insight in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. For a budget large enough to implement βh = ˜ β and if
∂2(ϵ)
∂α∂β < 0 in [βm,βh],
the regulator chooses α(β) = 1 for β ∈ [βm,βh] .
The explicit form of cross-derivative ∂2ϵ
∂α∂β in the range [βm,βh] is obtained by taking the

















where x = e∗
g−eg(αβ). Note that the cross-derivative might indeed be larger or smaller than
zero, and could even switch signs over the range [βm,βh]. From (23), the sign depends on the
structure of both c(·) and θ(·). In particular, for relatively large θ′′(x) and θ′′′(x), the compliance
incentive is larger than the deviation incentive and the cross-derivative is negative. That is, for
a relatively ‘stringent’ (‘lax’) penalty policy, ∂2ϵ
∂α∂β < 0 ( ∂2ϵ
∂α∂β > 0). Hence, Proposition 7 only
applies if the penalty schedule is ‘stringent’, compared to abatement costs. Note, however, that
the opposite case, relatively ‘lax’ penalties, is just as conceivable. For this case an interesting
feature of optimal auditing in [βm,βh] can be derived, which is summarized in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. For an existing βh and ∂2ϵ





g(eg(ˇ β)) + ˇ βθ′′(e∗








g) + ˜ βθ′′(0)
) · βh (24)
14for which the optimal monitoring pressure α(β) is decreasing in the interval [ˇ β,βmin] and in-
creasing in the interval [βmin, ˜ β] if the budget is too small to allow for α(β) = 1 within this
range.
Proof. See appendix.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, it is feasible that for levels of β between [ˇ β, ˜ β], optimal mon-
itoring pressure is not always decreasing in β. In particular, it is possible that a ‘U-shaped’
monitoring pressure exists within the range [ˇ β, ˜ β]. The details of this behavior are shown for-
mally in the mathematical appendix. As condition (18) is assumed to hold, the regulator will
for all β ≥ ˇ β at least implement auditing pressure ˇ α(β) which is decreasing in β. Hence, for
lower β in [ˇ β,βh], optimal monitoring is decreasing. Yet, if ∂2ϵ
∂α∂β > 0, i.e. if penalties are ‘lax’,
further increases in auditing pressure for larger β also yield larger gains from auditing. In fact,
for higher levels of β the relative inﬂuence of monitoring α on the expected penalty is larger
under a ‘lax’ penalty schedule than under a ‘stringent’ one. Hence, in the former case, it is
optimal to further increase monitoring pressure as soon as β is large enough (i.e. larger than
βmin).
Note, for the often-assumed quadratic forms of abatement cost and penalty functions, with
constant second derivatives c′′ and θ′′, cross-derivative ∂2ϵ




Hence, with quadratic functions, the general shape of optimal monitoring only depends on
the relative convexities of abatement costs and the penalty schedule.
The ﬁndings established in Propositions 2 to 8 are represented in Figure 2, which shows
possible optimal monitoring strategies of a regulator with a limited budget.
β
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Figure 2: Optimal monitoring with lower (case a) and larger (case b) monitoring budgets
Begin by looking at Figure 2 (a), depicting a case with a relatively narrow budget constraint.
From Proposition 2, zero monitoring pressure will be applied for those projects with β < βl.
Furthermore, as the regulator applies auditing pressure ˇ α(β) for all projects where this is
possible (Proposition 3) and ˇ α′(β) < 0, there exists a βm with α(β) decreasing in the range
[βm;1]. Depending on the relative frequency of good- and bad-type projects, the left hand
15branch of the optimal monitoring schedule (i.e. for β < βm) might either exist (Proposition 4)
or not (Proposition 5).
Figure 2 (b) represents cases for budgets large enough for βh to exist (Proposition 6). In
this case the left hand branch i.e. α(β) for β < βm, is more likely to exist. Furthermore, for all
depicted cases monitoring pressure decreases from βh onwards, as with increasing veriﬁability β,
lower levels of monitoring are required to induce full compliance of both types (i.e. ˜ α′(β) < 0).
The qualitative diﬀerence in monitoring in the depicted cases α1(β), and α2(β) are hence with
respect to the optimal schedule in the range [βm;βh]. As laid out above, these cases are easiest
to interpret if we assume penalty and cost functions to be quadratic.
Monitoring schedule α1(β) represents the case of a larger budget with relatively strict mon-
itoring (Proposition 7). Hence, in this case, projects with intermediate levels of veriﬁability are
monitored with probability 1. With a comparatively ‘lax’ penalty scheme and an intermediate
budget, optimal monitoring is ‘U-shaped’ between βm and βh, as established in Proposition 8.
Given an intermediate budget, and the marginal gains of emissions reductions for a change in α
are increasing in veriﬁability, an incentive exists to increase monitoring pressure in veriﬁability
level from βmin to βh. This case is represented by monitoring schedule α2(β).
4 Regulation with project admission
The existence of the diﬀerent thresholds identiﬁed above suggests an interesting extension of
the regulator’s set of instruments to reduce overreporting within credit-based mechanisms. In
addition to monitoring, the regulator could exclude project types with low levels of veriﬁability
from the mechanism. Within the CDM for example, the regulator can refuse the admission of
a project if the Project Design Document or the proposed Baseline Method do not correspond
to the speciﬁed standards.17 It is hence quite plausible that project admission standards could
also include a minimum level of veriﬁability.
The above-presented model results can be used to gain valuable insights for determining
sensible cut-oﬀ levels for project admission. In the context of this model, the regulator would
have to decide on a maximum tolerable level of opportunistic misreporting given a speciﬁed
budget. In most theoretical contributions on incomplete enforcement of environmental policy
instruments, the regulator is assumed to minimize emissions in the regulated system. As far as
climate change is concerned, this deﬁnition of the regulator’s objective seems sensible. In light
of the fact that there exists no consensus on the allocatively optimal level of emission reduc-
tions, determining a speciﬁc cut-oﬀ level based on welfare considerations would be particularly
problematic. As long as the exact level of the social cost of carbon is still disputed, the optimal
regulation under incomplete enforcement remains just as undetermined as the optimal level of
abatement.
Yet, the CDM remains a matter of political dispute. Even in the potential buyer countries,
the use of Certiﬁed Emission Reductions for meeting the Kyoto targets is not undisputed, as
some observers still challenge the morality of reducing emissions in third-world countries. As a
consequence, the sudden discovery of large scale fraud within a CDM project would signiﬁcantly
undermine the credibility of the whole Kyoto emissions trading regime as an instrument to
achieve emission reductions. Hence, it is plausible that the architects of the mechanism might
want to minimize the risk of discovery of fraud by reducing the range of eligible projects.
The objective of minimizing emissions within the combined markets would then imply a ‘no-
tolerance’ constraint, excluding any amount of overreporting within the credit-based system.
17The probability of rejection for a submitted CDM project is about 5 percent (UNEP/Risoe (2010)).
16In the framework presented above, such a policy would exclude all projects with a veriﬁability
lower than the minimum implementable βh(B). In this case all projects would be in perfect
compliance.
A ‘no-tolerance’ policy would result if program (6) were optimized simultaneously over
α(β) and project admission cut-oﬀ level βh(B). Obviously, with a large enough budget, i.e.
B ≥ ˇ B =
∫ 1
˜ β ˜ α(β)dβ, the regulator would simply restrict the set of eligible projects to the ones
for which β ≥ ˜ β and monitor these projects with the corresponding pressure of ˜ α(β). For those
cases where B < ˇ B, the corresponding cut-oﬀ value would have to be higher, as the monitoring
budget constraint becomes binding. As a consequence, the amount of eligible projects is further
restricted. Note that for such a regime, the regulator’s monitoring schedule will not be subject
to an actual optimization, as for each class of β the optimal monitoring policy is already known
to be ˜ α(β). Hence, the regulator’s decision is reduced to determining the cut-oﬀ level for project




˜ α(β) n dβ. (26)
Another intuitively sensible cut oﬀ-level would be βm(B), implying that overreporting is only
deterred for less eﬃcient projects, while some amount of ‘shirking’, in the reduction of more
eﬃcient projects, would still be possible. This less restrictive cut-oﬀ level might be acceptable if
the regulator also had to guarantee a large enough market volume for the credit-based regime.
The above-made considerations could also be extended to take into account that incomplete
enforcement can also exist on the associated cap-and-trade market, as in Sigman and Chang
(2011). In this case, the amount of overreporting allowed within the credit-based regime might
be adjusted to the corresponding share of non-compliance within the cap-and-trade market.
This would require a combined model of both markets, which represents an interesting extension
for future research.
5 Conclusion
The model presented within this paper allows some interesting insights into the nature of
optimal monitoring for credit-based systems, like the Clean Development Mechanism. It was
shown that under these circumstances even with an unlimited monitoring budget, overreporting
of reductions can not be completely disincentivized. The more interesting and realistic results
are, however, achieved when the regulator is assumed to be constrained in both its budget and
the information it holds on regulated emitters.
While under an unlimited budget all projects with positive veriﬁability will be monitored,
the situation signiﬁcantly changes under the assumption of a budget constraint. For this case,
it is shown that a rational regulator will completely refrain from monitoring those projects
that are most diﬃcult to verify. For the range of veriﬁability for which all projects are in
full compliance, optimal monitoring decreases in veriﬁability. Both results are in line with the
ﬁndings by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (2006) who analyze incomplete enforcement of
emission taxes without asymmetric information on costs. However, unlike emission taxes, the
general principle of credit-based emission trading systems implies that the regulator cannot
refrain to simply maximize the actual emission reductions but needs also to reduce the level of
overstatement within the projects’ reported reductions. This is due to the fact that certiﬁcates
issued on the basis of the reports will be used to oﬀset actual emissions elsewhere. Hence,
contrary to the the tax case, the regulator needs to minimize the overall level of overreporting.
17Due to diﬀerences in the objective function of the regulator as well as the asymmetric infor-
mation on cost types, the optimal monitoring strategy derived above signiﬁcantly diﬀers from
those proposed in the context of emission taxes or a cap-and-trade system. First, with a large
enough share of projects with high abatement costs, the regulator has an incentive to induce
full compliance for these cost types over the whole range of veriﬁability where this is possible.
Second, with decreasing veriﬁability, the optimal audit pressure features a ‘jump’ downwards
when reaching levels of veriﬁability, for which the regulator cannot deter overreporting by high-
cost projects. Third, for projects with intermediate veriﬁability, optimal monitoring pressure
can be either non-increasing or ‘U-shaped’, depending on the relative stringency of the penalty
schedule.
As the importance of credit-based mechanisms grows, attention is turning to the optimal
implementation and regulation of such schemes: something this paper has attempted to ad-
dress. Interesting avenues for further investigation include analyzing the combined asymmetric
information problem within cap-and-trade and credit schemes as well as further optimal project
admission (‘cut-oﬀ’) policies.
18Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
For β → 0,
dϵβ
dα , given by equation (14), approaches 0 as well, as the bracketed term in the
ﬁrst line is never inﬁnitely large for e ∈ [0,e∗
g]. Hence, according to condition (12), for β1 < β2,
reducing α1 to 0 is always eﬃcient for β1 small enough. Furthermore, it is easy to check that
for α = 0 the the bracketed term in the ﬁrst line of (14) is increasing in β. Hence, it follows
from condition (12) that all projects with β > βl(B) are monitored with positive probability.

Proof of Proposition 6:







After substitution of (14) into (27) for the respective values and rearranging, βh can be
expressed as βh = f(βl), where f(βl) is deﬁned as in proposition 6 i). Hence, as β ∈ [0;1],
βh exists if f(βl) ≤ 1.
ii) If βl = βm it follows from (12) that for the existence of the largest possible βh, i.e. βh = 1,
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) (29)
the upper boundary of β0 in proposition 6 ii). Hence, if the budget level is high enough
to apply monitoring pressure ˜ α(β) for all β ≥ β0, βh will necessarily exist. 
Proof of Proposition 8:
Note that if βh exists, βm = ˇ β, as (18) is assumed to hold. For an existing βh, condition (12)







For condition (30) holding with equality, β0 = βmin, as deﬁned in Proposition 8. Note that
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∂ϵˇ β(ˇ α(ˇ β))
∂α
, (31)
which is always the case for ∂2ϵ
∂α∂β. As ˇ α(β) is strictly decreasing in β optimal monitoring
α(β) is also decreasing in the range [ˇ β;βmin].
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where x = e∗
g − eg(αβ). Through comparison of enumerators of (23) and (33) it is easy to see
that if ∂2ϵ
∂α∂β > 0 then d2ϵ
d2α < 0. Hence, condition (32) can only hold if α(β) is increasing over
the range [βmin;βh]. 
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